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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS
The Authority To Issue An Attorney General's Opinion
The Attorney General of Mississippi is empowered by the law of
this state to issue written answers to questions posed by authorized
persons. Section 7-5-25, Miss. Code Ann. (1972) sets forth a list of
those authorized to request such opinions. In general, the list includes
the governor, the legislature, the chancery and circuit court clerks,
the secretary of state, the various state departments, state officers and
commissioners operating under the laws of this state, the heads and
trustees of state institutions, district attorneys, the various county and
city officials and their attorneys.
The Attorney General's Opinions function as a protective mea-
sure, so that there can be no civil or criminal liability against any per-
son or governmental entity who has properly requested the opinion,
setting forth all governing facts on the basis of which the Attorney
General's Office has prepared and delivered a legal opinion, and
which the requesting party has followed in good faith. This general
proposition holds true, unless a court of competent jurisdiction, after
a full hearing, shall judicially declare that such opinion is manifestly
wrong and without substantial support. No opinion shall be given or
considered if said opinion is given after suit is filed or prosecution
begun.
Issuance Of An Attorney General's Opinion*
Attorneys in the Attorney General's Office are assigned to specific
areas of law in which they specialize. After an opinion request is
received by the Office of the Attorney General, it is assigned to the at-
torney whose area of law it might concern. He then researches the
problem and prepares a draft of the opinion or answer. This draft is
then submitted to the Opinion Committee which is composed of nine
attorneys in the office, including the Attorney General. The Opinion
Committee meets twice weekly, on Tuesday and Thursday. At the
meeting of the Committee, the draft is discussed and reviewed. The
Committee either suggests changes, requests more information, or ap-
proves the draft if it is agreed that the analysis of the law is correct.
Should changes be suggested or more information requested, the
Committee sends the draft back to the attorney for revision. Upon
correction or addition, the draft is returned to the Committee where it
is again processed. If there are no further changes, additions, or cor-
rections suggested, the draft will be given final approval and issued as
an official Attorney General's Opinion.
*Prepared by Attorney General's Office
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OPINION NO. SO 81-02
SUBJECT: THE STATUS OF THE MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR AS-
SOCIATION. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 73-3-101-171 (1972) created the
Mississippi State Bar. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Mississippi
State Bar v. Collins, 214 Miss. 782, 59 So. 2d 351 (1952) stated that
"[t]he State Bar is in reality an agency of the state."
DATE RENDERED: March 12, 1981
REQUESTED BY: Mr. Elbert R. Hilliard, Director, Department of
Archives and History
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Marvin L. White,
Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Allain has received your opinion request and as-
signed it to me for research and reply.
Your request states:
The Department of Archives and History has recently acquired the
files and papers of the Mississippi Bar Association. We note that the
establishment of this association was mandated by the State Legislature,
and further, that in order to practice before the courts of the State an
attorney must be a member in good standing of the association.
We would like to have an opinion from your office as to the status
of the Mississippi Bar Association. Is it considered an official agency of
the State, or is it a private professional organization. The status accorded
the association will have a bearing on our handling of the papers we
have acquired and will affect the responsibility of the association to
abide by State Laws regarding the disposition of its files in the future.
Mississippi Code Annotated, §§ 73-3-101 to 73-3-171 (1972) as
amended, created the Mississippi State Bar. This legislation was first
enacted by the Legislature in 1932. 1932 Miss. Laws, Ch. 121. The
1932 enactment made all attorneys authorized to practice law, at the
time of passage, members of the Mississippi State Bar. The Legislature
further required that all persons thereafter admitted to the practice of
law in this State be members of the association. This language is now
codified as section 73-3-103, Miss. Code Ann. 1972). Prior to 1932
there was no requirement that practicing attorneys be members of a
bar association. There was no legislatively created State Bar Associ-
ation prior to 1932. Presently all attorneys are now required to be
members of and pay annual dues to the Mississippi State Bar as a pre-
condition to the continued practice of law. [Section 73-3-119]
Other sections of the Code dealing with the bar association also pro-
vide for the officers to be elected and their terms in office [§ 73-3-
1051, the duties of the secretary and his term in office [§§ 73-3-111 to
113], the location of the association office [9 73-3-1151, the amount of
dues to be paid annually by each member [§ 73-3-123], those exempt
from dues [§ 73-3-1251, and procedures for suspension after failure to
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pay dues [§ 73-3-127]. The Code also sets the duties of the officers,
how vacancies in these offices are to be filled, how and when board
members are to be elected and their duties. [§§ 73-3-129 to 141]. Fur-
ther, the procedures for investigating and disciplining attorneys is set
forth in statutory language. [§§ 73-3-143 to 169].
More importantly the Supreme Court of our State has spoken to this
very question. In Mississippi State Bar v. Collins, 214 Miss. 782, 59 So.
2d 351 (1952), the Court stated:
In view of its membership, its functions and the purposes of its cre-
ation, the State Bar, created by the act, possesses none of the attributes
of a private corporation .... The State Bar is in reality an agency of the
state for the purpose of regulating more effectively the practice of law
and for the purpose of encouraging the study of improved methods of
procedure and practice in the courts.
(emphasis added) 214 Miss. at 800.
In the case of In The Matter Of Mississippi State Bar, 361 So. 2d
503 (Miss. 1978) the Court stated:
4) By act of the Legislature, certain agencies were established,
made available and designated for purposes of assisting this Court in the
administration of its exclusive and inherent disciplinary jurisdiction,
which agencies this Court hereby adopts and accepts for that purpose;
namely, as provided by section 73-3-303 Mississippi Code Annotated
(Supp. 1977), the Board of Commissioners of the Bar, including the
Bar's Executive Director and the Complaint Counsel, the Bar's Com-
mittee on Complaints, and Complaint Tribunals appointed by this
Court.
6) However, the Board is an agency of this Court for disciplinary
purposes, and when it acts within that agency, it acts for this Court in a
function separate and distinct from that of the governing body of the
Bar.
7) As an agency of this Court, the Board authorized, empowered
and directed the President of the Bar to petition this Court for the relief
as requested and above set out.
(emphasis added) 361 So. 2d at 505.
These cases clearly state and the statute clearly indicate that the
Mississippi State Bar is a state agency. Therefore, the files and papers
of the State Bar acquired by the Department of Archives and History
should be handled and disposed of as those of any other State agency.
The Department should employ the applicable statutes and regulations
governing the maintaining and disposition of the State Bar's files in the
future.
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If this office can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesi-
tate to contact us.
Sincerely,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
Marvin L. White, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
MLW/mb
OPINION NO. SO 81-05
SUBJECT: CRITERIA FOR THE REDUCTION OF TEACHING
PERSONNEL BY A SCHOOL BOARD. Seniority may be used but it
need not be the sole criterion. Qualifications to teach in subject areas
may also be used and the final determination is an administrative deci-
sion. See Davis v. Winters Independent School District, 359 F. Supp.
1065 (N.D. Tex. 1973), affd 494 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974).
DATE RENDERED: March 24, 1981
REQUESTED BY: Mr. Arthur E. Bingham
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Susan L. Runnels,
Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Allain has received your letter of request dated
March 20, 1981, and has assigned it to me for research and reply. Your
inquiry states as follows:
I am a member of the Jefferson County School Board, Fayette, Mis-
sissippi, and I am writing for some information from your office.
We as board members would like to know if it is lawful to use
tenure or seniority in cutting teacher personnel.
You are aware of the fact that cutting is a problem, but we want to
do it in the right way. We would appreciate this information as soon as
we can get it.
It is the opinion of this office that seniority could be used as a crite-
rion in reducing the number of teacher personnel. However, this need
not be the sole criterion. In Davis v. Winters Independent School Dis-
trict, 359 F. Supp. 1065 (N.D. Tex. 1973), affd. 494 F.2d 691 (5th
Cir. 1974), a teacher's non-renewal was upheld pursuant to a reduction
in force although other teachers who remained on the staff had less
seniority. The criterion for non-renewal in that case was based on
qualifications to teach in subject areas. Other courts have also indicat-
ed teachers need not be terminated according to seniority. See Black v.
Joint School District, 14 Wash. App. 183, 535 P.2d 135 (1975); and
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South Kltsap School District No. 402, 8 Wash. App. 809, 509 P.2d 67
(1973).
Generally, in the absence of court ordered desegregation, when a
reduction in force is necessary, the choice of which teachers should be
retained is an administrative decision for a school board. Jordhal v.
Independent School District No. 129, 302 Minn. 286, 225 N.W. 2d
224 (1974). Accordingly, a school board should develop its own criteria
for reduction in force and apply it uniformly.
If this office can be of benefit in the future, please do not hesitate
to contact us.
Sincerely,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
Susan L. Runnels
Special Assistant Attorney General
SLR:hs
OPINION NO. SO 81-01
SUBJECT: THE RIGHTS OF NON-CUSTODY PARENTS TO
GAIN ACCESS TO THEIR CHILD'S STUDENT RECORDS. While a
student's records are not open to the public, parents whether they have
custody or not, do have a right to the records pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232(g).
DATE RENDERED: February 9, 1981
REQUESTED BY: Dr. J. D. Prince
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Susan L. Runnels,
Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Allain has received your letter of request dated
January 19, 1981, and has assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your inquiry states as follows:
There are instances where divorce courts grant custody of the chil-
dren to one parent. We recognize that custody refers to the physical
possession of the child by one parent excluding the other. Often times
parents with custody want to keep the other parent cut off from infor-
mation about the children. We face a problem in that federal records
specifically instruct us to allow "parents" to have access to the school
records of their children. The definition of "parent" does not indicate
whether or not the parent has or does not have custody.
Our specific question is, "If a non-custody parent asks to receive
copies of student's report cards or requests to look at the cumulative
record folder or desires to obtain other information relating to the
child's academic progress, are we permitted to provide such records for
1981]
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the non-custody parent in the absence of a court order specifically re-
stricting us from showing such records to the non-custody parent?
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 found at
20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) makes no distinction between custody and non-
custody parents. Therefore, if a non-custody parent requests informa-
tion concerning his child's records, the school district would be permit-
ted to provide such records in the absence of a court order terminating
this parental right.
If this office can be of benefit in the future, please do not hesitate
to contact us.
Sincerely,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
Susan L. Runnels
Special Assistant Attorney General
SLR:hs
OPINION NO. SO 81-04
SUBJECT: THE NEED TO CITE AN ADDITIONAL VIOLA-
TION WITH A DUI CHARGE. A valid DWI or DUI citation "is not
dependent upon the defendant being charged with additional or other
traffic offenses."
DATE RENDERED: February 5, 1981
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Eugene D. Brown, Jr.
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Ryan Hood, Spe-
cial Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Bill Allain has received your letter of February 3,
1981, and has assigned it to the undersigned for research and reply. In
your letter you state:
Re: Interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-5
I am the City Prosecuting Attorney for Holly Springs, and a ques-
tion has recently arisen regarding interpretation of the above-referenced
statute. Accordingly, I would certainly appreciate your staff rendering
an interpretive opinion of that portion of the above referenced statute
which provides:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle.., shall be deemed to
have given his consent... to a chemical test... if lawfully arrested for
any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while
the person was driving a motor vehicle... (Emphasis added)
Specifically, defense counsel here has asserted that in order for a
D.U.I. or D.W.I. citation to be valid, the defendant must also have been
[Vol. 2:187
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cited for some other offense; otherwise, the argument goes, the implied
consent provision is never activated.
It is the opinion of this office, predicated upon Section 63-11-5 of
the Mississippi Code, 1972, that a valid D.U.I. or D.W.I. citation is not
dependent upon the defendant being charged with additional or other
traffic offenses.
Very truly yours,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
r Ryan Hood
Special Assistant Attorney General
RH:cm
OPINION NO. SO 80-05
SUBJECT: PAROLE BOARD PROCEDURE. If a prisoner is eligi-
ble for parole, but has not paid his fine, he may be released on parole
unless the sentencing court finds that the prisoner is financially able to
pay the fine. The Parole Board and the Division of Community Ser-
vices of the Department of Corrections have sole authority over the
granting of parole and the parolees. Therefore, "there is no legal obli-
gation by the Parole Board to notify any county officials of an in-
mate's pending release."
DATE RENDERED: November 26, 1980
REQUESTED BY: Mr. Charles J. Jackson
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Robert L. Gibbs,
Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Bill Allain has received your letter of request
dated November 4, 1980, and has assigned it to the undersigned for
research and reply. In your letter, you state the following:
During my tenure in office, we have had several cases where the
sentence imposed consisted of a certain term of years, plus a certain
monetary fine - that is, as an example, "Five (5) Years, and $15,000
Fine."
My questions are as follows:
1) If an inmate is otherwise elegible for parole, can he be kept
confined simply because he cannot pay the assessed fine?
2) What obligation does the Parole Board have to notify county
officials of inmate's impending release?
3) Who should be notified?
4) What information should such notice contain?
5) Should a response to such notice be received before release of
inmate?
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In answering your first question, § 99-19-20 should be read, par-
ticularly § 99-19-20(2). This part reads as follows:
(2) The defendant may be imprisoned until the fine is paid if the
defendant is financially able to pay a fine and the court so finds, subject
to the limitations hereinafter set out. The defendant shall not be impris-
oned if the defendant is financially unable to pay a fine and so states to
the court in writing, under oath, after sentence is pronounced, and the
court so finds, except if the defendant is financially unable to pay a fine
and such defendant failed or refused to comply with a prior sentence as
specified in subsection (1) of this section, the defendant may be impris-
oned.
The United States Supreme Court has also held that the Constitu-
tion prohibits a state from imposing a fine as a sentence and then con-
verting it into a jail term because the defendant is unable to pay the
fine. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 28 L.Ed. 2d 130, 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971).
It is, therefore, the opinion of this office that an offender cannot be
confined simply because the defendant is financially unable to pay a
fine. This would apply also if an offender was eligible for parole. Nev-
ertheless, the final decision that determines whether an offender is fi-
nancially able to pay a fine is that of the sentencing court. And if the
court finds that an offender is financially able to pay a fine, the of-
fender may be incarcerated, subject to the limitations set out in § 99-
19-20(2)(a)(b) and (c). This is also true if at the completion of the jail
or prison term the prisoner claims indigency.
The answer to your second question is found in § 47-7-1 et seq.
Section 47-7-17 states: "Every offender while on parole shall remain in
the legal custody of the Department of Corrections from which he was
released and shall be amenable to the orders of the board." Section 47-
7-5 gives the Parole Board the exclusive responsibility for granting pa-
role and the exclusive authority for revoking parole. Once an offender
is paroled, § 47-7-9 directs the division of community services to su-
pervise the parolee released under their supervision, to stay informed
about the conduct and conditions of the parolee, and to keep detailed
records and make reports as the court or the Parole Board may re-
quire. Section 47-7-27 authorizes the Parole Board, in its discretion, to
issue a warrant for the return of a paroled offender upon a showing of
probable violation of parole.
Therefore, since the granting of parole and the revocation of parole
is granted exclusively to the Parole Board and the supervision of the
parolee is provided exclusively by staff personnel of the Division of
Community Services of the Department of Corrections, there is no le-
gal obligation by the Parole Board to notify any county officials of an




BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BYc41 I 1AO
Robert L. Gibbs
Special Assistant Attorney General
RLG:sac
OPINION NO. CR 81-02
SUBJECT: THE AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE
TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT IS VALID WITHIN THE EN-
TIRE COUNTY. A Justice Court Judge has coextensive jurisdiction
with the other district judges within his county. Therefore, a judge in
one district may properly issue a search warrant for controlled sub-
stances which are to be found in another district. See Reynolds v.
State, 136 Miss. 329, 101 So. 485 (1924).
DATE RENDERED: March 17, 1981
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Kellis Madison
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Ryan Hood, Spe-
cial Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Bill Allain has received your letter of March 11,
1981, and has assigned it to the undersigned for research and reply. In
your letter you state:
I am the City Prosecuting Attorney for the City of Pearl, Mississip-
pi and in that capacity I am requesting an opinion from your office
concerning the following matter:
Section 41-29-157 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, as
amended, details the procedure for the issuance of search warrants re-
garding controlled substances. In that regard, my question is:
Does a justice court judge have the judicial authority to issue a war-
rant from his jurisdiction to another justice court district wherein the
premises to be searched is located?
In response to your inquiry, please find enclosed a copy of Reynolds
v. State, 136 Miss. 329, 101 So. 485 (1924) in which the court cited,
with approval, the following language:
As conservators of the peace, with jurisdiction coextensive with the
county by the express provision of this statute, it is made the duty of
any justice of the peace of the county to issue the search warrant when a
proper affidavit therefor is lodged with him, and under this section a
1981]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
justice of the peace may issue a warrant to be served in any part of his
county.
Very truly yours,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: If yan Hood
Special Assistant Attorney General
RH:cm
End.
OPINION NO. CV 80-16
SUBJECT: WHAT FORMS MAY A REAL ESTATE BROKER
USE WHICH WILL NOT CONSTITUTE THE PRACTICE OF
LAW? The forms which a broker may use are those specifically al-
lowed in Miss. Code Ann. § 73-35-21 (1972), which include an earnest
money contract and other standard legal forms which have been ap-
proved by the bar association and the real estate board.
DATE RENDERED: September 30, 1980
REQUESTED BY: Mr. J. Daniel Schroeder, Administrator
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Stephen J.
Kirchmayr, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Bill Allain is in receipt of your letter of inquiry
and has assigned it to me for research and reply. Your inquiry con-
cerns the utilization of documents fixing and defining the legal rights
of parties to real estate transactions as contemplated by Section 73-35-
21, Mississippi Code of 1972, by real estate brokers. Due to the length
of your inquiry, we are attaching hereto and incorporating herein, a
true and correct copy of your request.
Section 73-35-21, Mississippi Code of 1972, provides inter alia:
... No real estate broker shall practice law or give legal advice di-
rectly or indirectly, unless said broker be a duly licensed attorney under
the laws of this state. He shall not act as a public conveyancer nor give
advice or opinions as to the legal effect of instruments, nor give opinions
concerning the validity of title to real estate, nor shall he prevent or
discourage any party to a real estate transaction from employing the
services of an attorney; nor shall a broker undertake to prepare docu-
ments fixing and defining the legal rights of parties to a transaction.
However, when acting as a broker, said broker may use an earnest
money contract form for the protection of either party against unrea-
sonable withdrawal from the transaction, provided that such earnest
money contract form, as well as any other standard legal form used by
the broker in transacting such business, shall first have been approved
[Vol. 2:187
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and promulgated for such use by the bar association and the real es-
tate board in the locality where the forms are to be used. A real estate
broker shall not participate in attorney's fees, unless said broker be a
duly licensed attorney under the laws of this state and performs legal
services in addition to brokerage services.
The above quoted statute clearly indicates the specific intent of the
legislature to prohibit anyone who is not a member of the bar of the
State of Mississippi from engaging in the practice of law. This prohibi-
tion "is not for the protection of the lawyer against the lay competi-
tion, but is for the protection of the public". Darby v. Mississippi State
Board of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684, 687 (Miss. 1966). It also
should be noted that "the courts have inherent authority, independent
of statute, to decide what acts constitute the practice of law". Darby,
supra, at 688.
A broker, pursuant to Section 73-35-21 is precluded from preparing
documents, fixing and defining the legal rights of the parties to a
transaction. The word "prepare" generally connotes "to provide with
necessary means; to make ready; to provide with what is appropriate
or necessary". Brennan v. Northern Electric Company, 72 Mont. 35,
231 P. 388, 389. Also see Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edi-
tion, 1968, P. 1344.
Accordingly, this language, standing alone prohibits a broker from
personally preparing any document that fixes and defines the legal
rights of the parties to a real estate transaction. "The practice of law
includes the drafting or selection of documents, the giving of advice in
regard to them, and the using of an informed or trained discretion in
the drafting of documents to meet the needs of the person being
served. So any exercise of intelligent choice in advising another of his
legal rights and duties brings the activity within the practice of the
legal profession." Darby, supra, at 687.
The legislature in Section 73-35-21, however, authorizes a broker to
utilize (1) "an earnest money contract form for the protection of either
party against unreasonable withdrawal from the transaction"; and (2)
"any other standard legal form used by the broker in transacting such
business". ONLY if such forms "have been approved and promulgated
for such use by the bar association and the real estate board in the
locality where the forms are to be used."
It, therefore, is the opinion of this office that a real estate broker
may provide and ultimately utilize forms in the transactions specifical-
ly allowed in Section 73-35-21 when such forms have been approved
and promulgated by the local bar association and real estate board.
Failure on the part of a broker to follow exactly the statutory language
of Section 73-35-21 could result in violation of the same, since, the
1981]
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courts have the authority, independent of any statute, to decide what
acts constitute the practice of law.
Trusting this responds to your inquiry, I am
Yours very truly,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
Stephen J. Kirchmayr
Special Assistant Attorney General
SJK/mg
OPINION NO. CV 81-01
SUBJECT: WHO MAY OBTAIN COPIES OF FINAL DECREES
OF ADOPTION? According to Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-17-25, 31
(1972), all proceedings are to be confidential. However, "officers of
the court, including attorneys, shall be given access to such records
upon request."
DATE RENDERED: March 23, 1981
REQUESTED BY: Mr. Gerald W. Bond
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Richard M. Allen,
Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Bill Allain has received your opinion request
dated March 19, 1981, and has assigned it to me for research and re-
ply, your letter of request stating:
Recently we have had numerous requests for copies-of Final De-
crees of Adoptions. This office was under the opinion that Final De-
crees, once signed by the Chancellor, and after all copies made at that
time, the file became a closed file. After that time, copies could be
made only by court order to protect confidentiality. We were citing
Mississippi 1972 Code Annotated Sections 9-5-169 and 93-17-25 as refer-
ence. Could you verify this practice as being either correct or incorrect
and cite the correct section for us?
Sections 93-17-25, 31, Mississippi Code of 1972, take adoption re-
cords out of the public records category indicated by Section 9-5-169,
ibid, copies of which referenced statutes are attached hereto for handy
reference.
Your office advised by telephone that many different people would
make requests for copies of final decrees of adoption, that some attor-
neys just send clients over to pick such copies up, etc.
The only persons or parties who may obtain copies, certified or un-
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certified, of adoption proceedings completed subsequent to July 1,
1955, are those set forth in said Sections 93-17-25, 31.
Also, access to the records by "officers of the court, including attor-
neys" does not include their procuring copies, for which copies an or-
der of the court would be necessary.
Yours very truly,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ~4~~77
Richard M. Allen
Special Assistant Attorney General
RMA:hs
Attachments
OPINION NO. CR 81-01
SUBJECT: BAIL MAY BE DENIED FOR PERSONS CONVICT-
ED OF CERTAIN SPECIFIED FELONIES. Pursuant to Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-35-115 (1972), "[a] person convicted of murder, rape, arson,
burglary or robbery shall not be entitled to be released from imprison-
ment pending an appeal to the supreme court", unless ordered to do so
by the supreme court, the trial judge or a judge from the district
wherein the person was convicted.
DATE RENDERED: March 31, 1981
REQUESTED BY: Sheriff Dolph Bryan
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Ryan Hood, Spe-
cial Assistant Attorney General.
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Bill Allain has received your letter of March 20,
1981, and has assigned it to the undersigned for research and reply. In
your letter you state:
The question that I would like an answer to concerns Circuit Court.
After conviction by jury trial in Circuit Court, and the person convicted
appeals to State Supreme Court.
Are there some offenses where the Circuit Judge can deny the per-
son convicted of an appeal bond, and order the convicted person to start
serving his sentence pending appeal?
In response to your letter your attention is respectfully invited to
Section 99-35-115 of the Mississippi Code, 1972, a copy of which is
enclosed.
19811
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Very truly yours,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: 
' 0Ryan Hood
Special Assistant Attorney General
RH:cm
End.
OPINION NO. SO 81-03
SUBJECT: WHAT IS THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR GAR-
NISHMENTS? The Mississippi Supreme Court in Leasy v. Zollicofer,
et al., 389 So. 2d 1378 (1980) interpreted Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-1
(1972) to mean that a writ of garnishment is only good until the next
return day of the next term of court which issued it. This, coupled
with the 30 day "grace" period, makes "garnishment procedures prac-
ticably and virtually unavailable and unavailing to a judgment credi-
tor."
DATE RENDERED: December 18, 1980
REQUESTED BY: Mr. Robert L. Taylor
OPINION BY: Bill Allain, Attorney General, by Richard M. Allen,
Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Bill Allain has received your opinion request
dated November 3, 1980, and has assigned it to me for research and
reply, your letter of request stating (in its entirety).
"In light of all the confusion concerning the withholding of gar-
nishments by the Chancery Clerk's office for county employees, please
advise as to what we should do."
The Supreme Court handed down its final ruling in Leasy v. Zolli-
cofer, et al., December 4, 1980, a copy of which I attach. Theretofore,
the language in Section 85-3-1, Mississippi Code of 1972, to the effect
that the set percentage of "salary, wages or other compensation"
should be retained by the garnishee-defendant "for such period of
time as it is necessary to accumulate a sum equal to the amount shown
as due the court on the writ or levy, at which time the garnishee shall
pay the same into court" had been construed as authorizing a judg-
ment creditor to have the clerk issue a writ of garnishment which
would be good from term to term until the judgment was paid or the
employment terminated.
However, the court in its Leasy opinion said otherwise and that the
writ was good only until the return date of the next term of court
which issued it, that this was true even though the 1980 Legislature,
[Vol. 2:187
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by amending Section 85-3-1(10)(a), gave the judgment debtor 30 days
of "grace" from the service of the writ and in the face of the above-
quoted statutory language. In its second opinion, the Court held firm
on its original opinion stating that the 30 days' grace allowance came
from a law not in existence at the time of the trial of the original case
and that if the Legislature had intended to change the existing law, "it
would have been a simple thing for them to have done so by appropri-
ate language or to have stated that such was their purpose."
The return-day of a term of court is the first of the term (or Rule
Day in Chancery) to which the process is returnable, and I know of no
authority to make process returnable other than to the next term of
court (or to a Rule Day on Vacation Day in Chancery). See Section 13-
3-11 and -13, ibid. Terms of court are fixed by statute in the case of
chancery, circuit and county court and by the justice court judge with-
in the statutory postscription of Section 9-11-15, ibid.
To sum up, under the Leasy case, there can be no withholding of
salary past the return-day of the term to which the writ is made re-
turnable, which means the next term of the particular court and not
even that until the 30 days has elapsed. Therefore, the Leasy case
makes salary and wages garnishment procedures practicably and virtu-
ally unavailable and unavailing to a judgment creditor in justice or
county courts and of extremely limited application in other courts.
If the Legislature wishes to change the law as set out in the Su-
preme Court opinion, the Supreme Court has given its direction.
Yours very truly,
BILL ALLAIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL
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